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Gould: California's Move-Away Law

COMMENT
CALIFORNIA'S MOVE-AWAY LAW:
ARE CHILDREN BEING HURT BY
JUDICIAL PRESUMPTIONS THAT
SWEEP TOO BROADLY?

1. INTRODUCTION
Courts often modify child custody1 orders when a parent
with custody of the children desires to relocate with the children. 2 When and how to modify initial custody orders when
one parent relocates is currently the most hotly debated issue
in California's family law courts. 3 The growing number of
these cases4 is largely due to the continuing rise in the divorce
rate coupled with an increasingly mobile society.s Further,
economic needs often require that a parent change residence
during the children's minority.6 In its struggle to create a

1. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990). "Custody of children" refers
to the "care, control and maintenance of a child which may be awarded by a court to
one of the parents as in a divorce or separation proceeding." Id.
2. See Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30
FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996).
3. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997).
4. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, Family Lawyer, Nachlis & Fink, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 8, 1997).
5. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). Judge Duncan points out that working parents are necessarily more mobile today, due in part to the rising frequency of corporate transfers. He
has litigated several move-away cases involving this circumstance. Id.
6. See In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 829 (Ct. App. 1994). See
also Lorie S. Nachlis, Overview of Move-Away Law and Policy, 19 FAMILY LAw NEWS 2,

527
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standard for custody modifications in these "move-away"
cases,7 the California judiciary has established judicial presumptions to determine whether to modify the initial custody
order. 8
Critics of current "move-away" laws contend that these presumptions are overbroad and, therefore, exclude consideration
of factors essential to a thorough analysis of what is best for
the children involved. 9 These critics argue that move-away
cases are too fact-specific and sensitive for a mechanical application of sweeping legal presumptions. 10 Factors such as children's ages, quality of the relationship with the non-moving
parent, and attachment to the community vary widely among
families. 11
This Comment will summarize the various types of custody
situations and their relevance in deciding move-away cases.12
Next, this Comment will examine In re Marriage of Burgess,13
a landmark California Supreme Court move-away case, and
discuss its impact on family law courts, families, and attorneys

1 (1996) [hereinafter "Nachlis"). One American in five changes his or her residence
each year, most often for economic reasons. Other reasons include remarriage, and
closer proximity to extended family. Id.
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1997).
Courts typically refer to cases involving a parent's desire to relocate with the children
as "move-away" cases. Id. See also Michele A. Katz, Tropea v. Tropea, Tropea and its
Recent Aftermath: Relocation Cases Decided After Tropea, 177 PLUCRIM 59 (1997). In
move-away cases, "the interests of a custodial parent who wishes to move away are
pitted against those of a noncustodial parent who has a powerful desire to maintain
frequent and regular contact with the children." Id. at 62. See infra notes 61-88 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the standard used for deciding move-away cases.
8. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). The primary presumption from Burgess is that a custodial parent may move with the children absent a
showing of detriment to the child caused by the move, because preserving the custodial
relationship is paramount. Id. at 478.
9. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, Clinical Psychologist, in San Francisco, CA (Aug. 19, 1997).
10. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, supra note 9.
11. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 4.
12. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different
custody situations.
13. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). See infra notes 54-88
and accompanying text for a summary of Burgess.
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involved with move-away cases. 14 Included is an examination
of certain factors that the Burgess court did not fully address in
its analysis.1 5 Finally, drawing upon public policy, social science research, legal commentary, and other jurisdictions' moveaway laws,16 this Comment will propose a more comprehensive
approach to deciding move-away casesP This approach limits
the application of judicial presumptions, and allows for greater
consideration of the specific facts of each case, especially
through recharacterizing the types of parent-child relationships that develop after the parents separate.18
II. BACKGROUND

The "custodial parent" is the parent declared in the custody
order to be the parent with whom the children primarily reside.l9 The "noncustodial parent" is the parent declared in the
custody order as having a lesser amount of time with the children. 2o When a custodial parent gives notice to the noncustodial parent of a planned move with the children, the noncustodial parent may petition the court to prohibit the move,· or to
change the initial custody order if the custodial parent does
move. 21 Whether a court will permit a parent to relocate with
the children generally depends on the type of custody arrange-

14. See infra

pact.

notes 203-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burgess's im-

15. See infra notes 89-223 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors
that the Burgess court did not fully address.
16. See infra notes 89-257 and accompanying text for a discussion of these sources
and what they expound.
17. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of a proposed
approach to deciding move-away cases that is broader than Burgess's.
18. See infra notes 264-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed
classifications of child custody.
19. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990). Additionally, "custody" refers to the "care, control, and maintenance of a child which may be awarded by the
court to one of the parents as in a divorce or separation proceeding." Id. See infra
notes 25-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of custodial parents.
20. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997).
21. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rice, No. D94-00144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31,
1997).
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ment currently in place.22 Courts examine whether the parents share joint custody or a less balanced custody situation.23
The type of custody the parents share generally determines the
standard of review the courts will use to decide whether to
permit a relocation. 24

A.

TYPES OF CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS

California law recognizes two general classifications of
physical custody: "joint physical custody" and "sole physical
custody.»25 Under California Family Code section 3400, parents who share "joint physical custody" are each expected to
spend substantial time with the children.26 However, how
equal the time share must be to be treated as joint physical
custody remains unclear.27 Many parents who co-parent under
the label of "joint physical custody" actually carry out a somewhat unbalanced time share in which one parent has primary
physical custody and the other has liberal visitation rights.28
The parent with "primary physical custody" has more responsibility for the children, and is generally the parent who provides
the children's main residence. 29
California Family Code section 3007 states that a parent
with "sole physical custody" has custody of the children; the

22. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of how moveaway cases should be evaluated based on the type of custody in place, as set forth by In
re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
23. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text regarding how courts determine
whether or not the parties have joint custody.
24. See Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvOC. 14,
15-16 (1997).
25. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for defmitions of "joint physical
custody" and "sole physical custody."
26. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3004 (West 1994). Section 3004 specifically defmes
joint physical custody as the situation in which "each of the parents [has] significant
periods of physical custody." This section adds, "Joint physical custody shall be shared
by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact
with both parents." Id.
27. See M. SUE TALIA, How TO AVOID THE DIVORCE FROM HELL 257-258 (Nexus
Publishing Company 1997) (1996).
28. See id.
29. See infra

notes 39, 273-275, and accompanying text, for further discussion of
"primary physical custody."
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other parent has only visitation rights. 3o Thus, an order for
"sole physical custody" assigns a more unbalanced time share
than does a "joint physical custody" order.31
B. THE INITIAL CUSTODY DETERMINATION
1. The "Best Interest of the Child" Standard

If parents do not stipulate to an initial custody arrangement,32 California courts apply the "best interest of the child"
standard in making the initial custody determination.33 Under
this standard, divorce should minimally alter the environment
in which children can grow into healthy, mature and educated
adults. 34 California Family Code section 3011 specifically requires that the court strive to protect the contact the child has
with both parents. 35
2. The Judicial Preference for Maternal Custody Awards

California custody law has historically reflected the traditional societal view of mothers as the children's genderappropriate domestic caretaker, and fathers as the working
provider. 36 Although California statutes no longer explicitly

30. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3007 (West 1994). Section 3007 specifically states that
"a child shall reside with and be under the supervision of one parent, subject to the
power of the court to order visitation." Id. See also Martin F. Triano & Kristine Fowler
Cirby, Move Away Cases, 1 FAM. L. NEWS (Law Offices of Martin F. Triano, San Francisco, Cal.), Oct. 1997, at 1.
31. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 3004 with CAL. FAM. CODE § 3007.
32. See Bourne v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 497 P.2d 110, 114
(Kan., 1972). Astipulation in this sense is an agreement made in a judicial proceeding
by the parties or their attorneys. See id.
33. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994 & Supp. 199B).
34. See Robert Stephan Cohen & Pamela Sicher, 'Tropea' and 'Browner': The Missing Evidence, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25, S5 (1996).
35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994). Section 3011 states, "In making a determination of the best interest of the child in a [custody) proceeding ... the court
shall, among any other factors it fmds relevant, consider ... [t)he nature and amount
of contact with both parents." Id. See generally Cohen & Sicher, supra note 34 (emphasizing the value of preserving the children's contact with both parents after divorce).
36. See generally Jennifer E. Horne, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other Fictions:
How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 2073 (July 1993) (examining judicial discretion used to resolve child custody disputes involving remarried parents, and in particular, detailing judges' gender stereotyping). See also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42
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incorporate gender stereotypes,37 actual custodial outcomes
still reflect gender biases.38 That is, courts subscribing to these
stereotypes generally award sole or primary physical custody to
the mother and visitation rights to the father.39 This tendency
is based largely on the status of the children's relationship with
each parent. 40 Courts tend to award custody to the parent who
spends the most time with the children, who is usually the
mother. 41 Moreover, the mother is still frequently perceived by
the courts as the parent who is better attuned to caring for
children. 42 Meanwhile, since the father still tends to provide

FLA. L. REV. 181 (1990). Ms. Schafran reviewed various task force reports on gender
bias in the courts and found "widespread bias against fathers on the part of some
judges who do not perceive men as being capable or appropriate primary caretakers."
Id. at 191.
37. See In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1979). In the Carney
opinion Justice Mosk wrote, "[Slince it was amended in 1972 the [California Family
Clode no longer requires or permits the trial courts to favor the mother in determining
proper custody of a child' of tender years.'" Id.
38. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, Family Lawyer, Berra-Spence, in San
Mateo, Cal. (Aug. 21, 1997). Ms. Cotten-Spence opines that in In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996), the California Supreme Court saw the parents in
stereotypical terms, casting the mother as the more domestic, caretaking parent and
the father as appropriately less involved due to his work obligations. The Burgess
court's perception is unrealistic in modem society where typically both parents have
jobs outside the home. See id. See also Amicus Curiae Brief of Richard M. Bryan at 26,
In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. 5046116). Richard Bryan
wrote that in Nellis v. Renwick, No. A070565 (Cal. Ct. App. med Aug. 9, 1996), "the
trial court's decision reflects the judge's apparent view that mothers are more capable
of providing day time child care than fathers." Id.
39. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKlN, DMDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 114 (Harvard University Press 1992). The
fmdings of the authors' study revealed that:
[Wlhen children are residing with the mother at the time of separation,
the father rarely succeeds in defeating her request for sole mother custody. When the children are living with the father, on the other hand,
although the father's chances improve significantly, they are not as
high. In those cases where there is dual residence at the time of separation, the father's chances of securing his requested custodial arrangement are not as high as the mother's, but are better than where
there is mother residence.
Id. at 105.
40. See id. at 268.
41. See id. at 105-06.
42. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, 4 THE FUTuRE OF
CHILDREN 210 (1994). The author writes:
If many judges believe . . . that children properly belong in maternal
care-especially during their early years-the "best interests" standard
provides the flexibility necessary to justify such a decision, regardless
of the meaning to the child of the relationships she or he shares with
each parent. Indeed, the preeminence of maternal custody awards
could reflect, in part, the continuing influence of the "tender years doc-
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more economic support to the children than the mother, he often spends less time with his children to meet work requirements. 43 Thus, the capacity of fathers for a meaningful postdivorce caregiving role is undermined by their pre-divorce economic support responsibility.44
Due to the judicial preference for maternal custody awards,
fathers are often discouraged from pursuing custody arrangements which allow them a more vital role in their children's
lives after divorce. 45 Consequently, divorce hurts children because of the loss of time, assistance, and affection provided by
the noncustodial father.46 Experts believe that children's compromised relationship with their noncustodial father results in
lower levels of social and scholastic adjustment for these children as compared with children from families in which the parents remain together.47 Children who lose closeness with their
father in the aftermath of a divorce struggle more in their peer
relationships and often suffer a loss of motivation in schoo1.48

trine" in the minds of many judges and their belief that mothers are
better suited than fathers for the care of the children.
[d. at 216-17.
See also Horne, supra note 36. In the author's survey of cases, findings revealed that:
Many courts considered fathers favorably if they could point to a person - generally
a woman - who was willing to help care for their children. In eight cases this person
was the father's new wife; in seven others it was another female family member,
usually his mother. Some courts also suggested that single fathers' efforts were
nothing short of extraordinary, even when they had a female caretaker to assist
them.
[d. at 2133.
43. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 268.
44. See Thompson, supra note 42, at 218-19.
45. See id. at 210,217.
46. See Paul R. Amato, Life·Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Di·
vorce, 4 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 143, 150 (1994).
47. See id.
48. See Robert D. Hess & Kathleen A Cameram, Post-Divorce Family Relationships as Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, 35 J. Soc.
ISSUES 79,92-95 (1979). The authors found that children who maintained close positive
relationships with both parents demonstrated less stress and functioned more effectively in work and social relationships with their peers. See id. See also Michael Rutter, Parent-Child Separation: Psychological Effects on the Children, 12 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. AND PSYCHIATRY 233 (1971). Studies show that there is an increase in delinquency and antisocial behavior when the father is absent. The delinquency is much
more pronounced when the father is absent due to separation or divorce rather than
death. See id. at 241-42.
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C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS IN MOVE-AWAY CASES BASED ON
THE PARENTS' CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT

In California's move-away cases involving parents with
court-ordered "joint physical custody," the children's need for
continuity and stability often leads to the judicial determination that preserving the custody status quo is in the children's
best interest. 49 Consequently, a request to move with the children made by a parent with joint physical custody may be denied. 5o The parent can still relocate, but will risk losing custody by relocating.51 By contrast, when one parent has "sole
physical custody" and the noncustodial parent has visitation
rights, California courts rely heavily on Family Code section
750152 and permit the sole custodial parent to relocate with the
children unless the move would cause the children significant
harm.53
D. IN RE MARRIAGE OF BURGESS REFINES CALIFORNIA'S MOVEAWAY LAw

In 1996, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue
of move-aways in deciding In re Marriage of Burgess,54 and
thereby established a precedent for subsequent California
move-away cases.55 In Burgess, the mother had sole physical
custody of the children, and the father followed a detailed
weekly visitation schedule, as well as an alternative schedule

also

49. See In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 565 (Ct. App. 1997). See
Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1996).
50. See, e.g., Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 546 (Ct. App. 1996).
51. See Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
52. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501(West 1994). Section 7501 states, "A parent enti-

tled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to
the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare
of the child." Id. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court,
in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Section 7501 was a relatively unknown section before
the Burgess court used it in making its ruling. Id. See infra notes 54-88, 203-223, and
accompanying text,regarding In re Marriage of Burgess and its impact.
53. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text regarding how California courts
identify a move that would significantly harm the children.
54. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (1996).
55. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (1997); In re Marriage of
Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Ct. App. 1997); Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
545 (Ct. App. 1996); Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1996).
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for biweekly weekend visitation which was dependent on his
work schedule. 56 The mother desired to move from Tehachapi,
California to Lancaster, California, a distance of forty miles, for
career advancement and greater access for the children to
medical and school facilities. 57 The father petitioned the court
to award him primary custody, testifying that the relocation
would inhibit his ability to maintain his current visitation
schedule. 58 The court permitted the mother to move with the
children, reasoning that preserving the children's relationship
with the mother outweighed preventing any resulting diminution of contact between the children and the noncustodial father. 59 A general rule emerged from Burgess that when the
parents do not share joint physical custody, the custodial parent may move with the children unless the move is motivated
by bad faith, such as to curtail the noncustodial parent's access
to the children.6o
Prior to Burgess, '~oint physical custody" meant that each
parent spent substantial time with the children.61 The Burgess
court narrowed the definition of "joint physical custody" to establish the standard of judicial review in move-away cases.62
The court dermed the term to mean sharing joint physical custody as mandated by court order and maintaining a roughly
equal time share arrangement with the children.63 Specifi-

56. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 477.
57. See id.

58. See id.
59. See id. See also infra notes 67, 93-99, and accompanying text for further discussion of the weight the Burgess court placed on preserving the custodial relationship.
60. See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text for further discussion of Bur·
gess's general rule.
6!' See supra note 26 and accompanying text for a statutory deflnition of "joint
physical custody." See also In re Marriage of Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737 (Ct. App.
1995). In Hoover, the court stated, "[WJhat is before us is a joint physical custody
situation where both parents have been actively involved since birth in rearing and
caring for their child. True, mother has had more custodial time, but this is a matter of
degree only." Id. at 742.
62. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n. 12.
63. See id. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1997). In
Ruisi, the parents shared physical custody both by court order and as a factual matter.
The father was awarded care of the child on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday; the mother
took care of the child on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday; and the parents alternated
care on Saturday, holidays and vacations. Thus, the parents had "joint physical custodY" as dermed by Burgess. See id.
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cally, in footnote twelve of Justice Stanley Mosk's majority
opinion, he stated:
A different analysis may be required when parents
share joint physical custody of the minor children under
an existing order and in fact, and one parent seeks to
relocate with the minor children. In such cases, the custody order 'may be modified or terminated upon the petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is shown that the best interest of the child requires modification or termination of the order.' The
trial court must determine de novo what arrangement
for primary custody is in the best interest of the minor
children. 64
By implication, Burgess holds that joint physical custody does
not exist where the actual arrangement between the parents
approximates equal time with the children despite a court order for an unequal time share.65 Similarly, joint physical custody does not exist under Burgess where the parents share
joint physical custody by court order but not as a factual matter. 66
E. THE REBUTI'ABLE BURGESS PRESUMPTION

In ruling that a parent with sole physical custody has a
right to move with the children, the Burgess court relied on the
rebuttable presumption that protecting the children's relationship with the custodial parent serves the children's best interest. 67 A noncustodial parent may rebut that presumption and
64. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n. 12 (second emphasis added) (citation omitted).
See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 721 (6th ed. 1990). "A de novo review involves
trying a matter anew the same as if it had not be heard before and as if no decision had
been previously rendered." Id.
65 See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n. 12.
66. See id.
67. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk stated:
"As we have repeatedly emphasized, the paramount need for continuity and stability in
custody arrangements-and the harm that may result from disruption of established
patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker-weigh heavily in
favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements." Id. at 478-479 (citing In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36,38 (Cal. 1979); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 493 (Cal.
1986».
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prevent the move only by demonstrating a change of circumstances that warrants an expedient or imperative custody
change to the noncustodial parent.68 A "change of circumstances" is a change relevant to the capacity of the moving
party or custodial parent to properly care for the child.69 The
"change" must not have been contemplated at the time of the
original custody order.70 In addition, the change must enhance
or adversely impact the welfare of the child.71 To demonstrate
the requisite changed circumstances, the noncustodial parent
must present evidence of significant changes since the initial
custody order. 72
Prior to

Burgess,

California courts traditionally did not ap-

ply the term "detriment" to custody proceedings between two

68. See Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986). In this case, the California
Supreme Court explained the change of circumstances requirement in the following
manner:
In deciding between competing parental claims to custody, the court
must make an award 'according to the best interests of the child' ...
The changed circumstances rule is not a different test, devised to supplant the statutory test, but an adjunct to the best-interest test. It provides, in essence, that once it has been established that a particular
custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court ...
should preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant
change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would
be in the child's best interest. The rule thus fosters the dual goals of
judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements.
Id. at 488 (citations omitted).
See also Carney, 598 P.2d at 38. Justice Mosk wrote in the dictum of the
Carney opinion:
It is settled that to justify ordering a change in custody there must generally be a persuasive showing of changed circumstances affecting the
child .... The reasons for the rule are clear: 'It is well established that
the courts are reluctant to order a change of custody and will not do so
except for imperative reasons; that it is desirable that there be an end
of litigation and undesirable to change the child's established mode of
living' (citation omitted).
Id.
69. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Buchard, 724 P.2d at 490 n. 5. Justice Broussard held that:
[T)he duration between a prior custody determination and a later trial
is immaterial to the application of the changed-circumstances rule.
Once it has been determined that a particular custody serves the child's
best interests, a party seeking to change custody must show a change in
circumstances, whether he brings his action two weeks after the determination or ten years later.
Id.
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parents. 73 Rather, the courts generally invoked the detriment
standard in custody litigation involving a child and a nonparent third party, such as a grandparent.74
Pre-Burgess
courts defmed "detriment" as an expected net harm to the
child, after weighing all relevant factors.75

Such harm may

result from the loss of a parent-child relationship.76
The

Burgess

court attached a somewhat different meaning
to "detriment" when applied to a move-away situation.77 In
determining what constitutes "detriment" in a move-away, the
court referred to California Family Code section

7501

which

prohibits "prejudice to the rights or welfare of the child. "78 The
detriment must render it "essential or expedient for the welfare
of the child that there be a change [of custody]."79 Under Burgess, a "change of circumstances" results in "detriment" to the
child. 8o A proposed move in itself is not sufficient to demon-

73. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N.
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 21, 1997).
74. See, e.g., In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974).
75. See, e.g., In re Marquis D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (Ct. App. 1995); Armando L. v.
Super. Ct. ofL.A. County, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Monica C., 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 910 (Ct. App. 1995); Cody W. v. Jill V., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852 (Ct. App.
1994).
76. See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1983). The
court in Phillip B. stated, ·Our law recognizes that children generally will sustain
serious emotional harm when deprived of the emotional benefits flowing from a true
parent-child relationship." Id. at 791.
77. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,482 (Cal. 1996). The court held
that the custodial parent may move with the children unless the move would infringe
upon the rights or welfare of the children. See id. at 476. It further held that the reduction in the father's visitation time that would necessarily follow from the move did
not constitute such an infringement. See id. at 484. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the Burgess holding.
78. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994). See supra note 52 for the complete
text of section 7501.
79. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 482, citing In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 38
(Cal. 1979).
80. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk stated
that the court should:
preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant
change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would
be in the child's best interests ... In a 'move-away' case, a change of
custody is not justified simply because the custodial parent has chosen,
for any sound good faith reason, to reside in a different location, but
only if, as a result of relocation with that parent, the child will suffer
detriment rendering it 'essential or expedient for the welfare of the
child that there be a change.'
Id. at 482.
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strate the change in circumstances necessary to rebut the presumption favoring preservation of the custodial relationship.81
Since Burgess, the legal use of the term "detriment" remains
problematically vague in the context of move-aways.82 Legal
experts suggest that detriment refers to a long-term adverse
effect that transcends the normal adjustment period of a
move. 83 Because this effect is difficult to predict, courts exercise wide discretion in determining the existence of a change of
circumstances that constitutes detriment.84

If the noncustodial parent proves that the motive for the
move is to intentionally disrupt visitation between that parent
and the child,85 a court may recognize detriment and modify
custody, despite the Burgess presumptIon favoring preservation of the custodial relationship.86 Absent such a showing,
however, a move's mere adverse impact on visitation rights
generally is not a change in circumstances sufficient to defeat
the Burgess presumption, because it is not expected to result in
detriment to the children.87 The move may result in a modifi-

81. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
82. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, LLP, in Palo Alto,
Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997).
83. See Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together
Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37
WM. & MARy L. REV. 1045, 1123 (1996).
84. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 82.
85. See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. 1990). The Gruber court held that a
motive of vindictiveness may constitute detriment. It stated:
The court must assure itself that the move is not motivated by a desire
to frustrate the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or to impede the development of a healthy, loving relationship between the
child and the non-custodial parent. An aspect of this determination is
the degree to which the court can be confident that the custodial spouse
will comply cooperatively with alternate visitation arrangements which
the move may necessitate.
Id. at 439.
86. See, e.g., Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 547 (Ct. App. 1996).
87. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 13-14, 17, In re Marriage of Rice,
No. D94-00144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 1997). Simons, J. stated in his decision:
[Tlhere is certainly language in Burgess that would suggest that once I
designated the mother as custodial parent, then I am to say father must
prove positive detriment or necessity in order to get me to deny
mother's motion .... And if there is no significant change in circumstances ... there is no need to show positive detriment .... I don't believe there has been a showing of a significant change of circumstances
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cation of the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, but generally not a shift in custody from one parent to the other.88
III.

DISCUSSION

The Burgess decision is tailored to the specific facts of that
case.89 Additionally, the Burgess court relied heavily on certain expert opinion without fully considering contrary opinion. 90 As a result, the Burgess rules have been inappropriately
applied to cases with widely different custody situations and
relocation circumstances.91 Such a mechanical application of

. . . . [Flrom a legal standpoint the reduction in [the father'sl involvement is not significant.

Id.
See also In Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996). Tennessee's move-away
law resembles that of California. In Aaby, the leading move-away case in Tennessee,
the noncustodial father presented expert mental health testimony that a move-away
would be detrimental to the child. Nevertheless, the court held that the move-away did
not establish an injury that was specific and serious enough to justify the drastic
measure of changing custody, because preservation of the nature of the relationship
between the child and custodial parent was paramount. See id. at 630.
88. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk wrote:
Even if 'prejudice' is not established and a change in custody is not' essential for the welfare of the child,' however, the trial court has broad
discretion to modify orders concerning contact and visitation to minimize the minor children's loss of contact and visitation with the noncustodial parent in the event of a move ....
Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
See also MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 295. The authors call attention to the consideration that:
it becomes important to know how much contact with non-residential
parents is needed for those parents to sustain a close, committed relationship with their children. Is a month in the summer, plus a Christmas holiday, enough? If so, long-distance moves are not as threatening
to a non-custodial parent as they otherwise would be. We do not yet
know the answer to the question of how much difference the frequency
of contact makes ....

Id.
89. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
90. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, Family Lawyer, Nachlis & Fink, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 8, 1997).
91. Telephone Interview with Susan Talia, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Susan
Talia, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 18, 1997). See Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess:
One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvOC. 14, 15-16 (1997) [hereinafter "Bryan"]. Mr. Bryan
noted, "The distance involved in Burgess was only 40 miles, which can be traveled in
less than one hour and is not unusual for California automobile commuters. None of
the heart-wrenching issues of a cross-country 'move-away' were present in Burgess."
Id. at 15.
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Burgess

precludes full consideration of other factors that may
be the strongest indicators of the children's best interest.92

A.

RESEARCH UPON WHICH THE PRESUMPTION IN BURGESS IS
BASED
The

Burgess

court appeared to rely substantially on two of
the four submitted amicus briefs. 93 Both amicus briefs argued
that stability and continuity in the custodial relationship are
determinative factors in the children's post-dissolution psychological adjustment. 94 The briefs cited studies indicating
that children's best interests are served by maintaining the
continuity of established parent-child relationships.95 As such,
the briefs asserted that children generally suffer greater harm
when a custody modification results in reduced contact with
the custodial parent than with the noncustodial parent.96 The
briefs also emphasized supporting a divorced parent's desire to

92. In Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996), Justice Titone wrote:
In reality, cases in which a custodial parent's desire to relocate conflicts
with the desire of a noncustodial parent to maximize visitation opportunity are simply too complex to be satisfactorily handled with any mechanical, tiered analysis that prevents or interferes with a simultaneous weighing and comparative analysis of all of the relevant facts and
circumstances.
Id. at 150.
93. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483. One of the amicus briefs upon which the Burgess court heavily relied was the Arnica Curiae Brief of Judith S. Wallerstein. The
other was the Amica Curiae Brief of Scott Altman, Janet Bowermaster, Carol S. Bruch,
Jan C. Costello, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Janice E. Kosel, Frances
Olsen, and Kelly Weisburg. The latter brief was submitted by Carol S. Bruch and
Janet Bowermaster on behalf of a group of nine law professors. The briefs the Burgess
court did not appear to rely upon were the Arnici Curiae Brief of Roberta M. Ikemi and
Joan Zorza in support of respondent Wendy Burgess, and the Arnica Curiae Brief of
Richard M. Bryan in support of appellant Paul D. Burgess. See id.
94. See Amica Curiae Brief of Judith S. Wallerstein at 17, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. S046116). The Wallerstein argument also states
that frequency and continuity of contact with the noncustodial parent is not nearly as
significant a factor in the child's psychological development as the preservation of the
custodial relationship. See id.
95. See Arnica Curiae Brief of Judith S. Wallerstein at 13, 17, In re Marriage of
Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. S046116), citing Joan B. Kelly & Judith S.
Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency,
46 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 20, 23 (1976).
96. See Arnica Curiae Brief of Scott Altman, Janet Bowermaster, Carol S. Bruch,
Jan C. Costello, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Janice E. Kosel, Frances
Olsen, and Kelly Weisburg at 23-25, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal.
1996) (No. S046116).
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build a new and separate life, which may involve a move to remarry, to pursue career opportunities, or to live near other
family members.97 They argued that when relocation is likely
to result in a substantially enhanced quality of life for a custodial parent, often the children's best interests are indirectly but
genuinely served. 98 By following the recommendations in these
amicus briefs, the Burgess court "[elevated] a parent's right to
relocate above the children's need for frequent and continuing
contact with both parents."99
B. RESEARCH THAT THE BURGESS COURT DID NOT CONSIDER

Practitioners have criticized the Burgess court for not considering contrary expert opinion. 100 By giving primary weight
to preserving the relationship between the children and the
moving custodial parent, Burgess allows only a remote possibility that in some divided families, other factors may outweigh
the importance of preserving the children's relationship with

97. See id.
98. See id. See also Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. 1990). Other state courts
also associate the custodial parent's desire to relocate with the children's best interests.
In this recent Pennsylvania case, the custodial mother wished to relocate to another
state for various reasons which included the absence of close friends and family where
she was, and frequent heated arguments with her ex-husband in front of her three
children. Also, her fmancial problems threatened her ability to support her children.
The contemplated move from Pennsylvania to Illinois offered the mother an opportunity to raise the children surrounded and supported by family and friends. See id. at
435-36. The court emphasized that the well-being of children was more closely allied
with the interests and quality of life of the custodial parent and therefore could not be
determined without reference to those interests. See id. at 440-41. The court therefore
permitted the mother to relocate with the children over the father's objections. Justice
Beck wrote in his majority opinion:
We think it is undisputable, under the circumstances of this case, that
appellant's ability to be an effective parent to her children is seriously
undermined by the difficulty and unhappiness of her life in Pennsylvania. Conversely, there is no question that the move to Illinois is likely
substantially to promote the well-being of the mother and, consequently
make her a more effective, superior parent. We think it is fundamental
that the best interests of the children cannot, in this case, be severed
from the interests of the mother with whom they live and upon whose
mental well-being they primarily depend.
[d. at 441.
99. See Bryan, supra note 91, at 15.
100. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. E.g., Interview with Richard
M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4,
1998) (pointing out that the Burgess court did not follow his recommendations in the
amicus brief he submitted.)
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the custodial parent. 101 The factors that the Burgess court neglected to thoroughly evaluate include, among others: the nature of the relationship that the children have with the noncustodial parent;102 the age of the children;103 the severity of conflict between the parents;104 and the distance and economic
burden of the move. 105 These factors could serve to compel a
court to prohibit the relocation. 106 Despite the reliance by California courts on Burgess's reasoning,107 critics argue that judicial decisions should not be based on a single threshold issue
such as preserving the custodial relationship.108 Without a
more flexible analysis, they argue, children's best interests may
be sacrificed for judicial uniformity.109 Following is an examination of the factors that Burgess did not fully evaluate.110

1. The Value of the Children's Relationships with Both
Parents
In California, two conflicting policies exist regarding the
children's relationship with their divorced parents,111 These
policies simultaneously emphasize the importance of the non-

101. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478-79. See supra note 67 for Justice Mosk's statement regarding continuity and stability in custody arrangements.
102. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996).
103. See Dorene Marcus & Jeffrey I. GarfInkel, The Trial: Opposing Relocation, 20
FAM. ADvoc. 41, 43 (1997).
104. See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151.
105. See Marcus & GarfInkel, supra note 103, at 43.
106. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483. The Burgess court conceded:
Although the interests of a minor child in the continuity and permanency of custodial placement with the primary caretaker will most often
prevail, the trial court, in assessing ·prejudice" to the child's welfare as
a result of relocating ... may take into consideration the nature of the
child's existing contact with both parents ... and the child's age, community ties, and health and educational needs.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Burgess court, however, stopped short of making consideration of these
factors mandatory and of analyzing how much weight courts may assign to
these factors. See id.
107. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1997).
108. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997).
109. Jeremy D. Dolnick, Article, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1113, 1117-1118 (1997).
110. See infra notes 111-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of those factors
not fully evaluated by the Burgess court.
.
111. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for identifIcation of these two
conflicting policies.
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custodial relationship while supporting the custodial parent's
decision to move with the children.n2 The Burgess court neglected to fully acknowledge the importance of the noncustodial
relationship. 113
Public policy inherent in California Family Code section
3020 highly values the noncustodial relationship and emphasizes the quantity of time with the noncustodial parent as critical to the preservation of that relationship.114 Specifically, section 3020 states that "it is the public policy of this state to assure that children have frequent and continuing contact with
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved
their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing
"115
At the same time, in cases in which a custodial parent is
moving to remarry, public policy discourages forcing a parent
to choose between her children and her new spouse, and therefore supports a custodial parent's move with the children.116
This public policy is reflected in California Family Code section
7501 which states that "[a] parent entitled to the custody of a
child has a right to change the residence of the child .... "117
California's conflicting public policies send mixed messages
to family courts that struggle with the move-away issue.118
However, the Burgess presumption, by valuing quality of time
over quantity of time with the noncustodial parent, favors pre-

112. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how these
two public policies simultaneously influence move-away adjudications.
113. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). In his dissent, Justice
Baxter recognized this shortcoming by stating, "As our statutory law makes clear,
California's public policy strongly favors the maximum contact between a minor child
and 'both' of his separated parents." Id. at 486 (citation omitted).
114. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West Supp. 1998).
115. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b).
116. See Arnica Curiae Brief of Scott Altman, Janet Bowermaster, Carol S. Bruch,
Jan C. Costello, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Janice E. Kosel, Frances
Olsen, and Kelly Weisburg at 17-23, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal.
1996) (No. S046116).
117. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994).
118. Telephone Interview with Richard M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw,
Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4, 1998).
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serving the custodial relationship at the cost of weakening the
noncustodial relationship.119 Unfortunately, this preference
exists even when the noncustodial parent is as significant in
the children's lives as the custodial parent by serving as a role
model or providing abundant emotional support and nurturance. 120

As post-Burgess courts favor a move by the custodial mother
over insuring continuity of contact with the noncustodial father,121 the resulting loss of contact with the noncustodial father adversely affects the children.122 In many cases, reduced
visitation after a move-away results in the foregone opportunity for future contact with a parent who may have been capable of providing love, support, and a link to the children's heritage.1 23 That parent becomes a visitor in the children's lives,
thereby weakening the parent-child bond that existed before
the relocation. 124
Recently, child psychologists have emphasized the importance of both parents to the children's well-being,125 and legal
experts have advocated strongly for the noncustodial father.126

119. See Llrie S. Nachlis, Overview of Move-Away Law and Policy, 19 FAMILY LAw
NEWS 2, 3 (1996). Burgess regards the relationship between the noncustodial parent
and the child as relatively unimportant. See id.
120. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997).
121. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 563-64 (Ct. App.
1997).
122. See Paul R. Amato, Life.Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Di·
vorce, 4 THE FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 143, 150 (1994) (discussing the repercussions of
parental absence).
123. See id.
124. See Robert Stephan Cohen & Pamela
Missing Evidence, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25, S5 (1996).
125. See Amato, supra note 122, at 153.

Sicher,

'Tropea' and 'Browner': The

126. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). See ELEANOR
E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DMDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 286 (Harvard University Press 1992). The authors stress that:
children who primarily reside with their mother can nevertheless receive a variety of benefits-psychological, social, and economic-from a
continuing relationship with their father .... [Tlhe relationship with
the father ... can provide emotional support in times of crisis and possible guidance for the child over the years. A father who has remained
in contact is also more likely to provide substitute care should some-
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Such an emphasis has resulted in an increased interest by fathers in joint custody; fathers appear to be more satisfied with
an approximately equal time share than with a visitation
schedule. 127
Moreover, recent case law reflects this emphasis on the importance of both parents. 128 For example, in Cassady v. Si-

gnorelli,129 although the parents had a court order for joint
physical custody, the daughter primarily resided with the
mother, and the father enjoyed regular and frequent visitations
with the daughter.130 When the mother proposed to move from
California to Florida with the daughter, the father protested.131
The court denied the mother's request to relocate with the
child, holding that it was not in the child's best interest to
move away from her father with whom she shared a close relationship.132

thing happen to the custodial mother or to the child's relationship with
the mother.
ld.
127. See Amato, supra note 122, at 153.
128. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case that
exemplifies the recent judicial emphasis on the importance of both parents in the children's lives.
129. See Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545 (Ct. App. 1996). The Cassady
court's ruling appears to misapply Burgess's reasoning. It focused on whether, according to Burgess, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the parties' custody arrangement was in the daughter's best interest. ld. at 546-47. The Cassady
court prohibited the mother's relocation with the daughter primarily because it found
that her job prospects in Florida were not realistic, and therefore not a strong enough
reason to deny the daughter the continued close proximity to her father with whom she
shared a good relationship. ld. at 547-49. The Cassady holding is not wholly consistent with Burgess's primary holding - that a custodial parent is free to relocate with
the child barring a vindictive motive. Specifically, in Cassady, Justice Peterson wrote:
Contrary to mother's contentions, the trial court did not err by failing
to give proper weight to the presumption that mother, as the primary
physical caretaker, should be permitted to relocate unless relocation
was not in Grace's best interests. (See Burgess, supra, 13 Cal. 4th at p.
32, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) Rather, the trial court properly
exercised its great discretion to determine the best interests of Grace,
and decided a relocation of her residence based only upon mother's
somewhat whimsical plans and very uncertain prospects in Florida was
not in Grace's best interests. (Ibid)
ld. at 548.
130. See id. at 547.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 545, 546.
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2. The Children's Ages

Just as the age of a child is an important consideration in
determining the initial custody order, age should also be considered in custody modifications that result from the custodial
parent's relocation. 133 Although the Burgess court noted the
significance of age in a footnote and in a brief acknowledgment
of California Family Code section 3042, which mandates that
courts consider the children's age in custody determinations,134
it stopped short of qualifying it as a necessary factor to be considered in a move-away adjudication. 135
Typically, children under two years of age are more dependent on the custodial parent, who is generally the mother.136 As
children mature, however, their psychological growth and their
diversified needs demand far broader parental roles and responsibilities from both parents. 137 As both parents assume
meaningful but different roles and relationships with their maturing children, each parent may become a "primary parent" in
separate ways.1 38 Often, children gradually regard each parent
as a gender role model, and later, as a friend and advisor.139
Therefore, when custody modifications involve children past
infancy, more weight should be given to the value of main-

133. Interview with Lorie· S. Nachlis, supra note 90.
134. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 483 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk
cited California Family Code section 3042(a) which states that "[ilf a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody,
the court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an
order granting or modifying custody." Id. He also noted "that amica curiae Professor
Judith S. Wallerstein ... observes that 'reasonably mature adolescents ... should be
given the choice ... as to whether they wish to move with the moving parent.'" Id. at
483 n.ll.

135. See id. at 483.
136. See Sandy W. Barnet & Richard M. Bryan, A Blueprint for a Move-Away Case
Part II: The Non-Move-Away Parent, 18 FAM. L. NEWS 4,5 (1996) [hereinafter "Barnet

Bryan"l. Young children's dependency on the mother is especially strong if a mother
is still nursing. See id.
137. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, 4 THE FuTuRE OF
CHILDREN 210, 217 (1994).
138. See id. The "primary" parent is the parent who plays a more central caretaking role in the children's lives. See id.
139. Telephone Interview with Kimberly B. Hogan, Clinical Psychologist, in Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 8,1998); see Thompson, supra note 137, at 219.
&
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taining relationships with both parents rather than just the
custodial parent. 140
Additionally, for older children, the importance of school,
established friendships, and a familiar neighborhood, argue
against a move-away,141 For example, in a 1986 California
case, In re Marriage of Rosson, 142 the custodial mother wished
to relocate with the children. 143 The children, ages ten and
thirteen, did not want to leave their familiar surroundings and
expressed a clear wish to reside with their father who lived locally rather than move long-distance with their mother,144 Despite the mother's status as the children's "psychological" parent,145 the court gave deference to the children's wishes and
denied the mother's request to relocate with the children,146
Thus, as Rosson demonstrates, a move away from a parent may
have a more powerful adverse impact on children at one age or
developmental stage than another.147
Had this case been decided after Burgess,l48 however, the
court may not have exercised the flexibility to consider these
important factors, because of the Burgess court's emphasis on
preserving the custodial relationship.149 Under a Burgess

140. See Thompson, supra note 137, at 221.
See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 6.
142. See In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986).
143. See id. at 254.
.
144. See id. at 254-55.
145. See Jennifer Klein Mangnall, Stepparent Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 Sw.
U. L. REV. 399 (1997). A'psychological parent' is "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day

141.

basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's
psychological need for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." Id. at 416 (quoting JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 98 (The Free
Press 1979) (1973». See also Jennifer E. Home, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other
Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45
STAN. L. REV. 2073 (July 1993). The author recognizes that the psychological parent is

the person to whom the children are most bonded. This parent "mayor may not be
their primary caretaker, and ... judges should conduct psychological evaluations to
determine how children feel about each parent." Id. at 2087. See also Guardianship of
Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789 (Ct. App. 1983) (considering the role of a "psychological parent" in a custody dispute between the child's biological parent and grandparents).
146. See Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 259-260.
147. See Marcus & GarfInkel, supra note 103, at 43.
148. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
149. See id. at 478-79.
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analysis, the Rosson court probably would have permitted the
mother's relocation with the children, subordinating the chil·
dren's best interests to the overriding concern with maintain·
ing the custodial relationship.1 5o

3. The Severity of Parental Conflict
Another factor the Burgess court neglected to thoroughly
account for is how the parents relate to each other.151 Joint
physical custody or sole physical custody with liberal visitation
are generally beneficial arrangements for children where di·
vorced parents cooperate with each other.152 Their cooperative
interaction contributes to the children's healthy development
and peace of mind. 153 Despite the growing frequency of fairly
balanced custody arrangements, however, many parents do not
cooperate with each other in sharing parenting responsibili·
ties. 154 Courts need to consider the type of custody that is best
for children when parents maintain an antagonistic relation·
ship with each other.155
Legal experts proffer conflicting ideas about what type of
custody arrangements are better for children in situations in·
volving combative parents. 156 Where parents with joint physi·

150. Compare Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (holding that, given the children's ages
and maturity, their preference to remain in the community had to be given serious
consideration by the court where the issue was whether the children should be moved
from the place where they have lived for most of their lives, and where a devoted parent remaining in the community wished to have the children reside with him), with
Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478 (holding that the paramount need for continuity and stability
in custody arrangements, and harm that may result from disrupting established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker, weigh heavily in favor of
permitting the custodial mother to relocate with the children).
151. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90.
152. See Amato, supra note 122, at 154.
153. See Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psycho·
logical and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30

FAM. L.Q. 305, 311 (1996) [hereinafter "Wallerstein & Tanke"). The authors add that
without harmonic relations between the parents, the children's sense of security is
threatened, and they may "view the world as an armed camp in which the child can
trust no one." [d.
154. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the
United States, 4 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 29, 36 (1994).
155. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90.
156. See infra notes 157·85 and accompanying text for discussion of desirable cus·
tody arrangements when parents do not cooperate with each other.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 9

550 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:527

cal custody maintain a state of severe parental discord, one
pool of legal experts discourage co-parenting plans that require
careful coordination between the parents of the children's social, academic, and extracurricular schedules. 157 Similarly,
where parents in conflict have an arrangement of sole physical
custody with noncustodial parent visitation, these experts advise against frequent visits with the noncustodial parent. l58
They reason that children do not benefit from being tossed into
the tumultuous sea of resentment, anger, and discontent that
flows too frequently from their parents' divorce.159
Specifically, these legal experts argue that although a generous time share between hostile parents may preserve contact
between the children and each parent, it may also exacerbate
conflict between the parents. 160 Such exacerbated conflict often leads to parental alienation which is harmful to the children's psychological well-being. 161 Parental alienation results
when one parent, usually the custodial parent, deliberately attempts to turn the children against the other parent, often by
making disparaging comments about the other parent to the
children. 162 Children may become emotionally troubled and

157. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. See Amato, supra note 122, at
154. See also Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 153, at 311. High conflict between
divorced parents with shared custody "can severely threaten the child's sense of security, confinning a view of the world as an anned camp in which the child can trust no
one." Id.
158. See Amato, supra note 122, at 150. See also Janet R. Johnston, High.Conflict
Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 165, 176 (1994) [hereinafter "Johnston"J.
159. See Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests' Analysis in New
York Relocation Cases?, 15 PACE L. REV. 339, 388 (1995).
160, See Riva Nelson, Parental Hostility, Conflict, and Communication in Joint and
Sole Custody Families, 13 JOURNAL OF DIVORCE 145, 155-57 (1989).
161. See Amato, supra note 122, at 154. See also Janet R. Johnston, Marsha Kline
& Jeanne M. Tschann, Ongoing Post-Divorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint
Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM, J. OF ORTHOPSHYCHIATRY 576, 578 (1989) [hereinafter "Johnston, Kline & Tschann"J. For example, the authors conducted a study
involving 100 children (ages 1 to 12) of high conflict divorce. The parents in the study
spoke disparagingly about the other parent to their children. Findings of the study
revealed that young children who had more alternating time with these discordant
parents were more emotionally and behaviorally disturbed. See id. Specifically, they
were more depressed, withdrawn, and/or uncommunicative, had more somatic symptoms, and tended to be more aggressive. See id. at 581-88.
162, See M. SUE TALIA, How TO AVOID THE DIVORCE FROM HELL 111·13 (Nexus
Publishing Company) (1996) [hereinafter "TALIA"J. But see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN,
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exhibit behavioral problems.163 Therefore, when parents are
unable to cooperate, or when one parent is violent or abusive to
the other parent, many experts recommend a sole custody arrangement with minimal visitation. l64
However, such a custody arrangement is not entirely beneficial to children. 165 The adverse effects of the judicial tendency
to award sole physical custody in situations where parents conflict sharply include: reducing the custodial parent's motivation
to cooperate with the noncustodial parent, further threatening
the children's bond with the noncustodial parent, and increasing litigation. 166 To begin, where courts tend to award sole
physical custody in situations of extreme parental conflict, parents may use this judicial tendency to their advantage,167 Parents recognize that once they have sole physical custody, courts
generally will rely on the Burgess presumption favoring preservation of the custodial relationship and permit a move with
the children. l68 As a result, a primary parent may choose not
to work through conflict with the other parent since doing so
could reduce the chances of being awarded sole physical custody.169 Courts, therefore, should be wary of the potential for

126, at 275. "A mother's conviction that it is good for the children to sustain
their relationship with their father is strongly associated with sustaining contact." Id.
163. See Leslie Milk, Studies Say Relaxed Divorce Laws Have Hit Hardest at Kids,
STAR-TRIB. OF MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, Jan. 2, 1996, at OlE, citing Joan B. Kelly, Executive Director of the Northern California Mediation Center, Corte Madera, CA.
Additionally, research on adolescents shows that when they feel caught between parents, they too are more likely to exhibit depression and anxiety, and they often engage
in "deviant behaviors" even years after their parents separate. See id. See also
Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 161, at 576.
164. See Amato, supra note 122, at 154. An arrangement that involves minimal coordination between intensely hostile parents protects the child from parental friction.
See id.
165. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, LLP, in Palo Alto,
Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997).
166. See infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text for further discussion of these
adverse effects.
167. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 165.

supra note

168. Id.
169. Id.
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the Burgess presumption to discourage parents in a custody
dispute from trying to cooperate. 170
Courts should also consider that a hostile custodial parent
often does little to facilitate the noncustodial relationship.l71 If
a move-away under such circumstances is permitted, the added
distance increases the risk that the children will lose their relationship with the noncustodial parent entirely.172 For example, the moving parent may be so blinded by ill feelings toward
the other parent that she fails to support the children in
working through their feelings of loss with regard to the noncustodial parent. 173 If left to manage such feelings of loss on
their own, young children may reason the nonmoving parent
must not be a good person. 174 Additionally, this unsupportive
behavior by the custodial parent can in turn motivate a resentful noncustodial parent to appeal a custody modification.175
Perpetual hostility and litigation between parents battling for
custody in the face of a move can ultimately hurt the children,
who are often used as pawns in their parents' power struggle. 176
A separate school of legal experts encourages joint physical
custody even when divorced parents are locked in conflict with
each other.l77 These experts reason that parents who refuse to
cooperate often have difficult personalities which may include
traits of distrustfulness and a reduced ability to communicate.178 Despite the conflict between the divorced parents, the
children may benefit from a balanced time share because one
parent's strengths can balance out the other's weaknesses.179

170. Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, Clinical Psychologist, in San Francisco, CA (Aug. 19, 1997).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. When the moving parent neglects to help the children through their
separation from the nonmoving parent, the impact of the loss is thus greater. [d.
174. See id.
175. Telephone Interview with Susan Talia, supra note 91.
176. Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, supra note 170.
177. See id. See generally Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 161, at 579 (describing personality shortcomings in parents who cannot settle their differences).
178. Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, supra note 170.
179. [d.
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Additionally, the balanced time share may be especially valuable for very young children, because they "have difficulty remembering an absent parent unless access occurs at more frequent intervals. "180
These legal experts further contend that where hostile parents do not share joint physical custody, the children's need for
a stable community environment is heightened.181 Thus,
where hostile parents fail to protect the children from their
own disturbed attitudes and behavior toward each other, the
children's best interests may not be served by permitting the
custodial parent to move with the children. 182 A move increases the disruption in the children's lives. l83 It therefore
may be appropriate to give greater weight in these custody decisions to providing the child with continuity in relationships
and a stable environment. l84 Prohibiting the children's move
enables them to continue receiving the support of teachers and
peers, and to remain in their own neighborhood and school environments. l85
4. The Distance of the Move-Away
A move-away is not formally defmed by California's Family
Code. l86 Further, courts have not established formal guidelines to manage the variability of distance in move-away
cases. 187 The Burgess court in particular did not specifically
address the distance factor, thereby failing to distinguish a
short-distance move from a long-distance move. l88

180. Janet R Johnston, supra note 158, at 179.
181. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N.
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 21, 1997).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Johnston, supra note 158, at 179.
185. See id.
186. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1 - 20043 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
187. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3.
188. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Interview with Richard M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal.
(Mar. 4, 1998).
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a. Long-Distance Move-Aways
Some legal experts emphasize the negative effects on the
children of visitation schedules that change after a longdistance move from frequent visits to occasional but longer visits, such as summers and holidays.189 The farther away the
move, the higher the degree of necessity for the move should be
shown by the custodial parent to outweigh the reduction in
contact between the children and the noncustodial parent.190
For example, in a long-distance move, the custodial parent may
"be required to show that the move is not merely preferable or
convenient, but rather ... essential and imperative. "191
Experts also assert that the noncustodial parent's fmancial
ability to make regular long-distance visitation trips is another
factor the court should weigh in determining whether to permit
a relocation. 192 When the moving parent is in a better financial
position than the nonmoving parent, the court may permit the
relocation and assign visitation costs to the moving parent.193
Commonly, however, neither parent has the financial means to
afford regular airline traveP94 Consequently, the high cost of
\

189. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90.
190. See, e.g., Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3.
191. Id. See also In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1991). In
fact, California's earlier case law held that "in an appropriate situation, an increase in
the distance between the child and the noncustodial parent will authorize an alteration
in the tenns of custody or visitation." Id. at 844.
192. See Bamet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 6. Interview with Richard M. Bryan,
Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Bamet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4, 1998).
The appellate court in Ruisi u. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Ct. App. 1997), remanded
the case for reconsideration of the mother's request to relocate with the child to Rhode
Island. Mr. Bryan is currently representing the mother at retrial. In arguing in favor
of granting the mother's request, he intends to emphasize that the father, who has
extreme wealth and no job, could conceivably purchase a second home for himself
wherever the child moves. See id.
193. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 484. The Burgess court ruled that the trial court has
broad discretion to modify orders concerning contact and visitation with the noncustodial parent in the event of a move, "e.g., by ... allocating transportation expenses to
the custodial parent, or requiring the custodial parent to provide transportation of the
children to the noncustodial parent's home." Id. See also, e.g., In re Marriage of Rice,
No. D94-00144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 1997). One additional measure to mitigate the hann to the child is court-ordered long-distance communication mechanisms
to maintain contact, such as a specially dedicated facsimile machine, video
conferencing system, or email account. See id.
194. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 6.
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long-distance travel often inhibits frequent visitation, generally
resulting in an eroded relationship between the noncustodial
parent and the children. 195 Arguably, prohibitive transportation costs could be used to establish detriment to the children if
they preclude regular visits with the noncustodial parent, and
thus justify denying a long-distance relocation. 196

b. Short-Distance Move-Aways
In a short-distance move, however, such as that in Burgess,
frequent and continuing contact may be maintained.197 Thus,
a mere preference to move might be sufficient if no significant
reduction of the other parent's time share would result.l 98 For
example, in In re Marriage of Selzer,199 the custodial mother
requested to move the short distance within California from
Ukiah to Santa Rosa to substantially reduce her one-hour
commute to work.200 Although the court granted the mother's
request to relocate with the daughter, it also increased the
nonmoving father's visitation.201 Thus, frequent and continuing contact was maintained despite the move.202
C. CUSTODY ORDERS AFTER BURGESS

When one parent attempts to prevent the children's relocation with the other parent, Burgess requires that there be a
initial court order for joint physical custody and a balanced
time share between the parents before the court may grant a
de novo review of custody to determine anew what outcome

195.

See id.

196. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Some family law judges, including Judge Duncun, view the
loss of contact with a father over a long-distance barrier as a detriment warranting
denial of a move-away. However, not all judges agree on this point. See id.
197. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 479. The court determined that "[al1though it would
be more convenient for the father to maintain a daily visitation routine with the children if they remained in Tehachapi, he would still . . . be able to visit them regularly
and often." Id.
198. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3.
199. See In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Ct. App. 1994).
200. See id. at 824.
.
201. See id. at 825. See also Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3.
202. See Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825.
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meets the children's best interests.203 As a result, courts since
Burgess give heightened deference to the language of the initial
court order and the daily calendars of each parent.204 Aware of
this heightened deference, parents attach great significance to
the custodial labeling process in the early stages of separation. 205
Since Burgess, more fathers campaign harder at the initial
custody hearing for an award of court-ordered joint physical
custody, hoping to avoid the risk of losing their children in a
later move-away adjudication. 206 Without a court-ordered label
of "joint physical custody," Burgess dictates that the court may
not grant a de novo review of custody.207 The noncustodial father then carries the burden of demonstrating the change of
circumstances required to modify custody or prevent a relocation. 208 He must show that the move would result in detriment
to the children. 209 If the noncustodial father fails to meet this
burden, the Burgess presumption favoring preservation of the
custodial relationship typically prevails, inclining courts to
grant the custodial mother's request to relocate with the children. 210

203. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for a de novo custody review in move-away cases.
204. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 165.
205. See Bryan, supra note 91, at 16-17.
206. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 165. See also Nancy Z. Berg & Gary
A. Debele, Postdecree Custody Modification: Moving Out of State and Changes to the
Parenting Relationship, 10 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 183, 191 (1996). Recent research also
indicates that joint custody appears to be becoming more common. See id.
207. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). Ms. Karkazis
observes through her mediation and evaluation work that parents are well aware of the
Burgess decision, and they are rightly concerned about the impact of that decision on
their own custody modification litigation. See id.
208. See id.
209. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes detriment.
210. Telephone interview with Mary McNeal, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Mary
McNeal, in Berkeley, Cal. (July 14, 1997). Ms. McNeal criticizes the Burgess decision
for its overly heavy reliance on court-issued custody labels. She opines that these labels result in unfairness to noncustodial fathers who play an important role in their
children's lives regardless of the label, and who do not want to lose their children to a
long-distance move with the mother. See id. See infra notes 264-85 and accompanying
text for further discussion of custody labels.
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Burgess's joint physical

custody defi-

Parents' struggle to fit

nition211 creates problems that are particularly detrimental to
children, such as increasing litigation and hostility between the
parents. 212 Often, attorneys and mediators spend considerable
time counseling clients about how to draft the initial custodial
agreement so that it meets the defmitional requirements established by Burgess for a de novo review in move-aways.213 In
the process, attorneys can easily lose sight of the ultimate issue
of children's best interests by focusing on the labels more than
the

custody arrangement that best meets the children's
needs. 214 Additionally, these legal procedures are costly, and

211. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1996). The Burgess court defmed "joint physical custody" to mean sharing physical custody as mandated by court order and maintaining a roughly equal time share arrangement with
the children. See id. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of Burgess's "joint physical custody."
212. See infra notes 213-23 and accompanying text for further discussion of the detrimental effects to children of parents' struggle to fit Burgess's "joint physical custody"
defmition.
213. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). See also Linwood R. Slayton, Jr., Custody, Visitation, Divorce: Factors to Consider When Representing the Father, NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 1996, at 16. Mr. Slayton reminds that M(a]ttorneys have an afiIrmative duty to zealously advocate on behalf of the
client but they also have a duty to ensure that the children ... suffer as little as possible as the process unfolds and ultimately comes to a conclusion." Id.
214. See generally Richard Updegrove, Jr. & Roberta L. Thompson, The DoubleEdged Sword of Child Relocations: Successful Representation of the Parents, 45 R.I.
B.J. 11, 13 (1997) (outlining how the Tropea and Burgess decisions might effect client
representation in Rhode Island). See also JANET R. JOHNSTON & VMENNE RoSEBY, IN
THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND
HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE 224 (The Free Press
1997). The authors urge that:
family law attorneys' primary role is not to strategically maneuver the
presentation of evidence and evoke statutes and case law to win their
client's case-as if their clients were indifferent to the effects of a legal
victory on the lives of their children and as if the need for an ongoing
working relationship with the other spouse/parent were irrelevant ....
[T)he family attorney's role includes counseling clients fully on their
rights and responsibilities as parents and co-parents, and exploring
deeply the ramifications of all the clients' actions not only on the clients' welfare but on the welfare of the children as well. The attorney
can then responsibly and ethically advocate for their clients' more .
clearly defined interests.
Id.
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often generate ill-will between the parents, which ultimately
hurts the children.215
Focusing chiefly on the labels can cause further problems
when one parent petitions to modify custody in a move-away
adjudication. 216 Court-issued labels often do not accurately
describe the custody arrangement that the parents actually
share. 217 Specifically, while parents may have a court order for
joint physical custody, the time share that the parents exercise
and the relationships between the children and their parents
may reflect a more unbalanced custodial arrangement.218 Nevertheless, in a move-away case, post-Burgess courts generally
determine the standard of review based on the language of the
initial custody order.219 Thus, Burgess has the unfortunate
effect of shifting the emphasis away from consideration of the
actual relationships the children have with each parent in favor of the custody labe1.22o
Another significant problem with relying on the joint physical custody label is that as parents amplify their concern about
the percentage of time the children are with them, their interest in timekeeping begins to loom larger than their interest in
the children's needs. 221 The children's lives often are seriously
disrupted by their constant shuttle between their parents'
separate homes. 222 Consequently, the benefits to children of
joint physical custody can easily be clouded by the ongoing
215. See generally Bryan, supra note 91 (discussing the implications of the Burgess
decision).
216. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
problems labels cause in move-away adjudications.
217. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10,1997).
218. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for a distinction between courtordered joint physical custody and the actual custodial arrangement.
219. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997).
220. See id.; Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, Family Lawyer, Berra-Spence,
in San Mateo, Cal. (Aug. 21, 1997). Noncustodial fathers who attempt to prove that a
move will result in detriment to the children will often hire a psychological evaluator to
scrutinize the children's relationships with each parent and then testifY in court about
those relationships. Placing the children under intense observation can be especially
unsettling for children. See id.
221. See TALlA, supra note 162, at 104.
222. See id.
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hardship of bouncing between parents who insist on maintaining an inflexible timeshare schedule.223
IV. CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL

Since Burgess, the presumption favoring continuity of the
custodial relationship induces courts to strive to keep the custodial relationship intact, thereby helping custodial parents
gain judicial permission to relocate with their children.224
Without the relative ease of gaining judicial permission, these
parents, who are generally the mothers, would face a greater
risk of being forced to choose between relocating and keeping
their children.225 An unfortunate effect of the Burgess decision
is the noncustodial father's increased risk of becoming the longdistance parent who seldom sees his children.226 As a result, a
tension has developed between "the effect of changing the
child's contact with the non-custodial parent and the often
positive reasons for the custodial parent's desire to relocate."227
Mounting concern about the effect of Burgess on fathers' loss of
contact with their children suggests that California should
modify its move-away law.228 Specifically, California should

223. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 220.
224. See Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvOC. 14
(1997) !hereinafter "Bryan"). "Burgess eases the ability of a custodial parent to move
freely." Id.
225. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993). In this
pre-Burgess case, the mother had to show that the move was in the children's best
interests before the court would allow her to relocate with them. See id.
226. See Jeff Woods, Singer Joins Dads Fighting Custody Laws, NASHVILLE
BANNER, Apr. 7, 1997, at AI. The Burgess decision parallels the Tennessee Supreme
Court's holding in Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996), discussed infra.
Tennessee singer Radney Foster laments the effect of Tennessee's move-away law in
the words of his song, 5,000 Miles: "Cause it don't matter how much you love them, or
if you've acted faithfully. They can take away your precious children. Five thousand
miles from Tennessee." Id.
227. See Richard Updegrove, Jr. & Roberta L. Thompson, The Double-Edged Sword
of Child Relocations: Successful Representation of the Parents, 45 R.I. B.J. 11 (1997).
228. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Judge Duncun describes the "fathers' movement" as organized groups comprised primarily of fathers who voice criticism of California's current move-away law and advocate for statutory modifications. One group, the Coalition of Parent Support, publishes a widely circulating newsletter and has chapters
throughout the state. See id. See also Monroe L. Inker & Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.,
Can Custodial Parents Dictate a Child's Home?, MAss. L. WKLY, Feb. 24, 1997, at 11.
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discard its presumptions and instead apply a "best interest of
the child" analysis, as employed in other jurisdictions.229 California should also develop additional child custody labels that
more accurately describe the custody arrangements that parents maintain.23o
A. GUIDANCE FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS' MOVE-AWAY LAws

Throughout the United States and internationally, applicable standards to determine when a custodial parent may relocate over the objection of the noncustodial parent remain disparate. 231 Several jurisdictions' move-away laws may offer
guidance to the California legislature.232
Despite the prevalence of presumptions favoring custodial
parent relocation in the 1990s, some jurisdictions are indicating a renewed preference for the "best interest" analysis over
the "change of circumstances" test. 233 California should also
re-adopt the "best interest" analysis in move-aways to insure
the best possible outcome for the children.234
Jurisdictions using a "best interest" standard reject deciding
relocation cases by using presumptions that skew the analysis. 235 They reason that such a mechanical application of legal

The belief that children benefit from regular contact with both parents continues to run
strong in our society and parental rights continue to fmd many supporters. Id.
229. See infra notes 235-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "best interest" standard used by other jurisdictions.
230. See infra notes 270-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed custody labels.
231. See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A2d 434, 437 (Pa. 1990).
232. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997).
233. See Nancy Z. Berg & Gary A Debele, Postdecree Custody Modification: Moving
Out of State and Changes to the Parenting Relationship, 10 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 183, 189
(1996). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a description of the "best
interest" analysis. See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text for a description of
the "change of circumstances" test.
234. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993) (applying
the "best interest" standard more freely before the Burgess decision).
235. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996). In the Tropea
opinion, Justice Titone wrote, "[I]t serves neither the interests of the children nor the
ends of justice to view relocation cases through the prisms of presumptions and threshold tests that artificially skew the analysis in favor of one outcome or another." Id.
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doctrine is not in the best interest of children or the pursuit of
justice.236 Instead, these jurisdictions weigh a wider range of
factors, such as the quality of the children's relationship with
the noncustodial parent and the children's ages.237
A recent New York case, Tropea v. Tropea,238 exemplifies
this broader analysis in its application of the "best interest"
analysis. 239 In Tropea, the custodial mother desired to move
long-distance to join her fiance and raise her sons in the new
family unit, thereby effectively eliminating the noncustodial
father's regular midweek visits. 24o The New York Court of Appeal found no single factor dispositive on the issue of whether
to permit the relocation.241 Instead, the court considered many
factors such as the psychological impact on the children if the
custodial mother's goals were thwarted, the impact on the relationship between the children and the noncustodial parent, and
both parties' economic circumstances.242 The court ultimately
affirmed the district court's decision to permit the relocation,
finding that the move was in the children's best interest.243

236. See id.
237. See id. Justice Titone wrote:
These factors include, but are certainly not limited to each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationship
between the child and the custodial and the noncustodial parents, the
impact of the move on the quality and quantity of the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial
parent's and child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and
educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable
visitation arrangements.
[d.

238. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
239. See id. Justice Titone wrote, "In the end, it is for the court to determine, based
on all of the proof, whether it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence
that a proposed relocation would serve the child's best interests." [d. at 151-52.
240. See id. at 146.
241. See id. at 150-51 (discussing the various factors weighed in the decision of
whether or not to permit the relocation, but not concluding that a particular single
factor was ultimately determinative).
242. See id.
243. See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 152. See also Robert Stephan Cohen & Pamela Sicher, 'Tropea' and 'Browner: The Missing Evidence, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25, S5 (1996). Nevertheless, the Tropea court is criticized for denying the father "the opportunity to establish, with psychological evidence and expert testimony from a forensic mental
health professional, whether the proposed relocation was proper under the new 'best
interest' standard." [d.
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Further, in Aaby v. Strange,244 the custodial mother requested the court's permission to move out-of-state with her
minor son, against the father's wishes. 245 As in Burgess, the
Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a presumptive right of
the custodial parent to relocate with the child wherever she
wishes to move. 246 The court held that the custodial mother
was allowed to remove the minor child to Kentucky notwithstanding the father's objection that the move interfered with
the noncustodial parent's access to the child.247 It further held
that the relocation was impermissible only if the noncustodial
parent proved the motive for moving was vindictiveness towards that parent.248
Justice White's dissent criticized the majority for placing a
high degree of importance on the custodial parent's unrestricted freedom to relocate. 249 He stated that the law should
require a custodial parent who desires to relocate to first demonstrate that the move would not harm "the child's social, educational, psychological and health needs.''250 Presently, a bill
before the Tennessee legislature addresses the issues raised in
White's dissent. 251 The bill proposes returning to the "best in-

244.

See Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996).
245. See id. at 624.
246. See id. at 629. See also Inker & Kindregan, supra note 228, at 11.
247. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 629. See also Inker & Kindregan, supra
11.
248.
249.
250.
251.

note 228, at

See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 629.
See id. at 631 (White, J., dissenting).
[d.
See Woods, supra note 226, at AI; S.

1235, 100th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 1
(Tenn. 1998). The bill states, in pertinent part:
(c) If the non-custodial parent does petition the court for a hearing, the
court shall conduct one as soon as possible after notifying the parties.
The court, in its discretion, may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child or children if the court does not believe
they will be adequately represented by the parties. The sole issue at
the hearing shall be whether the proposed move of the child or children
out-of-state is in the best interests of such child or children. The custodial parent, the non-custodial parent and the guardian ad litem, if one
is appointed, may offer proof on the issue.
(d) If the court determines that moving the child or children out-of-state
is in their best interest, it shall issue an order authorizing the move. If
the court determines that it is not in their best interest, it may issue an
order prohibiting the move or it may modify or change its original
award of custody.
[d.
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terest" standard in move-away cases involving an out-of-state
relocation,252 and requiring the moving parent to prove that
the move is in the children's best interest. 253 California should
enact a similar bill because it already has provided for wide
discretion in the code and case law has supported placing a certain burden on the moving parent.254
Moreover, a recent decision in the Court of Appeal of the
United Kingdom ruled that a mother who had temporary custody should not normally be allowed to remove a child from
Colorado to England without the father's consent.255 In dictum, the court discussed the rights of noncustodial parent in
relocation cases. 256 Specifically, the court stated that because
both parents have the right of custody, one mother's unilateral
removal of the child is wrong because it precludes the father's
exercise of his right. 257
In taking guidance from the move-away laws of other jurisdictions, California should abandon its presumptions in favor of

252. See S. 1235, 100th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 1 (Tenn. 1998). This bill not
only changes the burden of proof in Tennessee's move-away cases, but also establishes
that the minimum distance requirement is a move out of the state. See id. California
has not yet formally defined the distance required for qualification as a move-away.
See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text for further discussion of the absence of
distance perimeters in California's move-away law.
253. See Woods, supra note 226, at AI. The bill is recommended by a special legislative committee that studied child custody issues at length. See id.
254. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994) (giving the court the "widest discretion" in choosing a parenting plan that is in the child's best interest). See also In re
Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993). In Roe, a pre-Burgess case, the
court held that the moving parent does in fact bear a burden of proof, but it is the burden to show that the move is not only necessary to the custodial parent but also is in
the best interest of the child. See id. See also In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
824 (Ct. App. 1994). Subsequently, the court in Selzer cited to Roe and observed that
"this standard, derived from the present language of § 3040(b) ... properly harmonizes
and strikes a balance between the rights of the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, and the child." Id. at 828.
255. See In re F (A Minor), (1995) 3 W.L.R. 339.
256. See Inker & Kindregan, supra note 228, at II.
257. See In re F (A Minor), (1995) 3 W.L.R. 339. Judge Butler-Sloss wrote:
I am satisfied that the mother and father both enjoyed equal and separate rights of custody by Colorado law .... The removal of the child by
the mother [therefore) interfered with the rights of the father in that he
was prevented from actually exercising them in the U.S.A. . . . In so
doing, she was in my judgment in breach of the father's rights ... and
the removal was wrongful.
Id. at 344.
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a proposed move by a custodial parent.258 Courts could then
exercise greater discretion and flexibility to decide cases where
the noncustodial parent is genuinely opposed to the move.259 A
move will be allowed, or disallowed, because one of the parties
has demonstrated that it is, or is not, in the children's best interest. 260 As Justice Baxter noted in his Burgess dissent,261
when the California legislature adopted the Family Law Act in
1969, it specified that custody disputes must be decided solely
on the basis of the children's best interests.262 California case
law must not contravene that mandate.263

B. THE NEED FOR MORE ACCURATE CUSTODY LABELS
The Burgess opinion recognizes only two formal classifications of physical custody: ''joint physical custody" and "sole
physical custody with visitation rights."264 To noncustodial
fathers who are significantly involved in parenting despite not
having joint physical custody, the "sole physical custody" label
is offensive. 265 Noncustodial fathers understand that when a
mother is granted "sole physical custody," post-Burgess courts
may regard the mother has having full custodial responsibility
258. Cf. Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests' Analysis in New
York Relocation Cases?, 15 PACE L. REV. 339, 385 (1995) (proposing that New York

should abandon an "exceptional circumstances" test and adopt a "best interest" test,
with the burden on the custodial parent to show that the move satisfies the "best interest" test criteria).
259. Cf, id. at 385-86 (proposing a four-part analysis that would require the court to
consider all relevant factors before a move is permitted).
260. See id. at 386 (urging abandonment of presumptions against relocation and
the required showing of threshold exceptional circumstances, and instead permitting a
move only if the children's best interests will be served).
261. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 484-86 (Cal. 1996) (Baxter, J. dissenting).
262. See id. at 485.
263. Cf, Judge Donald R. Ash, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody
Law in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM L. REV. 769 (1997) (emphasizing that Tennessee's mandate cannot be contravened). Judge Ash cautions that the "best interest" standard can
allow too much judicial discretion. He states that "the lawyer's victory may very much
depend on the accurate perception and manipulation of the court's leanings, or upon
creating them. The court must do a better job in its application of [the best interest)
standard." Id. at 804.
264. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997).
265. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Courts can quite casually assign the designation of "sole
physical custody" without realizing its possible implications. See id.
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for the children, and attach minimal custodial value to the father's parenting involvement, regardless of the frequency and
quality of his visitations. 266 The court may then simply rely on
the Burgess presumption favoring preservation of the custodial
relationship and permit the mother's move.267 The term "sole
physical custody" also disparages the significance of the role of
the father in the child's emotional or psychological development268 by relegating him to the outside parent with "visitation
rights" only.269
The California legislature should institute "primary physical custody" and "secondary physical custody" labels to more
appropriately identify many parenting plans and to offer fathers without joint physical custody greater recognition of their
parenting roles. 27o The "primary custodial parent" designates
that parent in whose physical custody the children remain
most of the time, and who, therefore, has more responsibility
over the children. 271 The "secondary custodial parent" has the
children for less than half time but still plays a vital role in the
children's lives. 272 Although some courts currently assign joint
physical custody with "primary physical custody" to one parent
to assure that parent that she will have more custodial time
with the children,273 the "primary physical custody" designa-

266. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, Family Lawyer, Nachlis & Fink, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 8, 1997).
267. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). See supra note 67
and accompanying text for a description of the Burgess presumption.
268. See Miller, supra note 258, at 387.
269. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, Family Lawyer, Berra-Spence, in San
Mateo, Cal. (Aug. 21, 1997). See also Arnica Curiae Brief of Richard M. Bryan, In re
Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. S046116). Mr. Bryan writes that
"[t)imesharing percentages and loose terminology have no place in weighing real life
considerations to children going through a move-away experience. What is really important is the quality, intensity, and bonding of the child's relationship with each of its
parents." Id. at 24.
270. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269.
271. See Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1996). See also Ruisi v.
Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 1997) (demonstrating that the "primary
caretaker" is not necessarily the parent in whose custody the children remain all of the
time, but rather, in whose custody and care the children remain most of the time).
272. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N.
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 20, 1997).
273. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 19~7). See also Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
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tion is merely "window dressing," and cannot be enforced because it is not defined in the California Family Code or formally recognized by the courts.274 Moreover, it does not constitute an official custody designation for the purpose of triggering a standard of review in move-away cases.275
The "primary" and "secondary" physical custody designations are beneficial to parents and children in several ways.276
First, they are more honest descriptors than "sole custodial
parent" and "noncustodial parent with visitation rights" in
many situations where the father assumes significant parenting responsibilities.277 A "secondary custodial parent" label
validates the parenting role and describes dedicated parental
involvement, whereas "visiting rights" suggests that the noncustodial parent is merely a visitor in the children's lives.278
This nomenclature also emphasizes to parents that custody
orders are not "joint or nothing" propositions.279 This understanding encourages a cooperative attitude between the parents, and helps them recognize the children's need to maintain
a close, continuing relationship with each parent.280 Greater

274. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997).
275. See Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
276. See infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the positive
effects of the "primary" and "secondary" custody designations.
277. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269.
278. C{. Ash, supra note 263, at 801 (advocating replacing terms such as "custody"
and "visitation" with terms that do not convey ownership of the child or only a peripheral involvement by the noncustodial parent).
279. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269. Ms. Cotton-Spence notes
that the words "sole" and "visitation" sound threatening to many parents and therefore
tend to produce litigation. See id. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKlN,
DMDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 279 (Harvard University Press 1992). The authors suggest that the labels courts use in the custody order
influence co-parental relations and patterns of parenting. They write, "We suspect ...
that the reforms enacted by California divorce law, explicitly authorizing joint custody
and encouraging frequent and continuing contact with both parents, have had something to do with our rmding of relatively high frequencies of joint physical custody
awards and sustained visitation." ld.
280. C{. Ash, supra note 263, at 806 (proposing goals for establishing parenting
agreements that include removal of legal jargon, and recognizing the benefit of maintaining a close relationship with both parents).
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cooperation between parents thereby reduces custody modification litigation. 281
Additionally, loose definitions of "primary" and "secondary"
physical custody afford parents the opportunity to settle into
their own best pattern of shared custody.282 In contrast, if ordered by the court to follow the rigid custody schedules associated with "joint physical custody" or "sole physical custody with
visitation rights," parents may exercise a co-parenting routine
that is uncomfortable for them and the children.283 Perhaps
most importantly, the new labels may incline courts to regard
co-parenting plans differently.284 The labels may signal courts
to attach greater weight in the custody evaluation to the father's role and give courts more flexibility to consider the importance to the children ofthe father's role in their lives.285

v. CONCLUSION
In re Marriage of Burgess and subsequent California courts
emphasize the distinction between joint physical custody and
sole custody with noncustodial parent visitation in move-away
cases. 286 Although largely ignored by the courts, abundant social science research and expert legal opinion discourage joint
and sole physical custody designations because they preclude a
thorough evaluation of the actual relationships between the

281. See Miller, supra note 258, at 388.
282. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269.

283. Id.

284. Interview with Richard M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 11, 1998).
285. Interview with Judith H. B. Cohen, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Judith H.
B. Cohen, in Corte Madera, Cal. (Mar. 13, 1998). Ms. Cohen notes, however, that certain jurisdictions in California rely more on existing labels than others to interpret the
relationships between the children and each parent. In particular, several courts in
the San Francisco Bay Area have demonstrated a reluctance to rigidly follow Burgess's
'joint" and "sole" custody distinction, looking beneath the labels to understand the
child-parent relationships. See id.
286. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (1997); In re Marriage of
Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Ct. App. 1997); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473
(Cal. 1996).
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children and each parent.287 Studies show and various cases
illustrate that the quality of the noncustodial parent's relationship with the children is not necessarily a function of the duration or frequency of visits288 or of the court-ordered label for
that relationship.289 Many legal professionals and psychologists point out that the substance and character of the parentchild relationship, and not the particular form, is often most
critical in deciding a custody modification proceeding.29o
Furthermore, Burgess provides little guidance for the majority of move-away cases.291 This is due to the relatively simple facts and short-distance move contemplated in that case.292
For these reasons, the Burgess presumptions should not be mechanically applied to cases with significantly different facts and
varying shared custody arrangements.293 Presumptions only
simplify the complicated inquiries inherent in move-away
cases. 294 The courts must not lose sight of the child's best interests in an effort to promote judicial economy and uniformity.295

287. See, e.g., Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvoc.
14, 16 (1997). California's statutory defmitions of "joint" and "sole" physical custody
are imprecise and deceptive. See id.
288. See Michele A. Katz, Tropea v. Tropea, Tropea and its Recent Aftermath: ReLo·
cation Cases Decided After Tropea, 177 PLIICRIM 59, 63 (1997). See also Sondra Miller,
Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests' Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?, 15
PACE L. REV. 339, 366 (1995).
289. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997).
290. See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston, Children's Adjustment in Sole Compared to Joint
Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision Making, 33 FAM. & CON·
CILIATION CTS. REV. 415, 419 (1995).
291. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997).
292. Id. Burgess involved a move of only 40 miles, but most move-aways involve a
moving of a distance of far greater than 40 miles. See id. Telephone Interview with
Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). Of the many move-away cases that Sharon
Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis have mediated, no two cases have been factually alike.
See id.

293. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, LLP, in Palo Alto,
Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997).
294. See Katz, supra note 288, at 63.
295. See Richard Updegrove, Jr. & Roberta L. Thompson, The DoubLe-Edged Sword
of Child Relocations: Successful Representation of the Parents, 45 R.I. B.J. 11 (1997).
See also Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). Justice Titone wrote, "... given
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Instead of a mechanical Burgess approach, California courts
should use a more flexible definition of a change of circumstances in a move-away situation.296 Insofar as a change of
circumstances must result in detriment to the children, this
definition must be broadened to encompass consideration of the
loss of proximity to the noncustodial parent who is significant
in the children's lives. 297 In protecting the custodial parent's
freedom to make decisions about her own future and the future
of the children, courts should not permit the imposition of an
excessive handicap on the relationship between the children
and the noncustodial parent.29B
The resolution of move-away cases involves imperfect and
often painful solutions,299 and applicable standards vary across
jurisdictions.30o In addressing the shortcomings of the Burgess
decision, California courts should look for guidance in the
holdings in other jurisdictions301 that consider a wider range of
factors which affect the well-being of children in divided families. 302 Additionally, California lawmakers should codify custody designations that more fairly characterize actual divided
parenting situations instead of relying on narrow statutory

the variety of possible pennutations, it is counterproductive to rely on presumptions
whose only real value is to simplifY what are necessarily extremely complicated inquiries." Id. at 150.
296. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N.
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 21, 1997).
297. Id.
298. See

Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A2d 434, 441 (Pa. 1990).
299. Telephone Interview with Susan Talia, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Susan
Talia, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 18, 1997).
300. See Nancy Z. Berg & Gary A. Debele,Postdecree Custody Modification: Moving
Out of State and Changes to the Parenting Relationship, 10 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 183, 184185 (1996). Compare In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (establishing
a California presumption that the custodial parent may relocate with the child because
preserving the custodial relationship is paramount), with Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d
145 (N.Y. 1996) (applying New York's 'best interest of the child' test that weighs multiple factors without any presumptions favoring the moving parent).
301. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). The Tropea court held
that"... in all cases, the courts should be free to consider and give appropriate weight
to all of the factors that may be relevant to the detennination." Id. at 15I.
302. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615, 643 (1992).
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definitions that fail to capture the nature of the relationships
that parents share with their children.303
It is impossible to devise a judicial formula for a divided
custody arrangement that perfectly suits all, or even most,
families. 304 However, the more equipped California courts are
to understand the ties that children have to each parent in
move-away cases, the better the judicial outcomes will be for
children. 305 After all, children are innocent victims in divorce
and are ill prepared to handle a changing family situation.306
Therefore, the rights and needs of the children must be accorded the greatest weight.

Jennifer Gould*

303. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). By relying on old statutes that identify physical custody as
either "joint" or "sole," the Burgess court made a decision that was legalistic in nature,
not socialistic. See id.

304. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DMDlNG THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 296. (Harvard University Press 1992).
305. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Judge Duncan cautions that attempting to actually characterize the actual shared custody arrangement could result in an evidentiary battle
between the parents. See id.
306. See Katz, supra note 288, at 63.
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